A higher labor tax rate increases the equilibrium real interest rate and reduces the equilibrium wage in a heterogeneous-agent model with endogenous savings and indivisible labor supply decisions. I show that these general equilibrium adjustments, in particular of the real interest rate, reinforce the negative employment impact of higher labor taxes. However, the representativeagent version of the model, which generates similar aggregate employment responses to labor tax changes, implies that general equilibrium feedback is neutral. The cross-country panel data reveal that the negative association between labor tax rates and the extensive margin labor supply is signi…cantly and robustly weaker in small open economies where the interest rate is less tightly linked to domestic circumstances. This empirical evidence supports the transmission mechanism of labor tax changes for employment in the heterogeneous-agent model. Keywords: labor income tax; labor supply elasticity; general equilibrium; cross-country panel JEL codes: E21, E24, J21, J22
Introduction
The goal of this paper is to explore general equilibrium (GE) feedback regarding the employment e¤ects of labor tax changes. The degree to which labor taxes a¤ect employment and aggregate hours worked is central to various questions in economics. 1 Although recent studies of aggregate labor supply in the macroeconomics literature increasingly adopt richer and more realistic models, little attention has been given to the role of GE feedback. 2 GE considerations are often assumed away by exogenously setting a …xed interest rate (so called a small open economy assumption) or …xed wages in partial equilibrium settings. This paper …lls this void and intends to enhance the understanding of GE channels through which labor taxes a¤ect employment.
I …rst conduct a quantitative theoretical analysis based on (i) a heterogeneous-agent model with indivisible labor supply and incomplete asset markets, built upon Chang and Kim (2006) and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) ; and (ii) its representative-agent counterpart (Hansen, 1985; and Rogerson, 1988) . The main …nding is that the transmission mechanism of labor tax changes for equilibrium employment in the two economies di¤ers sharply, despite similar aggregate employment responses to labor tax changes. 3 Speci…cally, GE feedback with respect to labor tax changes reinforces negative employment responses in the heterogeneous-agent model whereas it plays no role in the representative-agent model. A novel contribution of this paper is the emphasis on the role of the equilibrium interest rate that is found to be quantitatively relevant in amplifying the negative employment impact of labor taxes. In particular, despite the fact that labor tax changes lead to seemingly small changes in the real interest rate, I …nd that these interest rate changes a¤ect aggregate employment quite substantially, increasing the long-run labor supply elasticity from 0:18 1 to 0:34 in the heterogeneous-agent model. 4 I show that this GE feedback can be traced to the heterogeneous behavior of households.
Speci…cally, in the heterogeneous-agent model, the labor supply behavior of households with high productivity is nearly inelastic to labor tax changes whereas their savings behavior is very much a¤ected by labor tax changes. 5 As a result, the aggregate e¢ciency unit of labor falls relatively less than other macroeconomic aggregates, including aggregate capital stock, with respect to higher labor taxes. This leads to lower equilibrium wages and higher equilibrium interest rates, both of which tend to reinforce the negative impact of labor taxes on employment. Note that this mechanism emphasizes GE feedback resulting from interactions between the labor market and the capital (or asset) market in contrast to conventional GE considerations, which focus on marketclearing wages within labor markets.
I also conduct an empirical analysis to test the novel implication of the heterogeneous-agent model relative to the representative-agent model: interest rate adjustments matter for the employment e¤ects of labor taxes. As the interest rate in small open economies (SOEs) is less tightly linked to domestic circumstances, a testable implication of the theory is whether the negative employment impact of higher labor taxes is weaker or not among SOEs, compared to non-SOEs. Using a fairly large cross-country panel data set, I …rst document that the negative relationship between the labor tax rate and the extensive margin labor supply is considerably ‡atter among SOEs. Moreover, labor supply elasticities estimated from panel regressions in the spirit of Prescott (2004) and Chetty et al. (2012) show that the elasticity among SOEs is signi…cantly lower than that among non-SOEs, which is in line with the transmission mechanism of labor tax changes on aggregate employment in the heterogeneous-agent model. This paper builds on the literature that compares the aggregate labor supply implications of heterogeneous-agent models compared to representative-agent models. 6 As in Ljungqvist and 4 This elasticity is based on steady-state comparison with respect to permanent tax changes while transfers are held …xed. When transfers adjust, the role of interest rates is still large (increasing it from 0:18 to 0:40). Note that these steady-state elasticities are generally smaller than the intertemporal elasticity with respect to temporary tax changes (Chetty, Guren, Manoli and Weber, 2012) .
5 Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) explore the implication of this mechanism for social welfare and the crosscountry di¤erences in average labor productivity. focuses on the role of transfers for this mechanism and its implication for the aggregate labor supply elasticity. 6 These analyses are along the same line as the literature which studies whether heterogeneity matters for aggregate ‡uctuations (e.g., Krusell and Smith, 1998; Thomas, 2002; Chang and Kim, 2007; Khan and 2 Sargent (2008) and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) , my paper also con…rms that household heterogeneity per se may not be crucial in terms of aggregate employment responsiveness to labor tax changes. However, my paper is distinguished from the existing studies in carrying out decomposition of aggregate employment changes and in highlighting the role of GE feedback explicitly.
Further, my paper also conducts an empirical analysis using cross-country panel data, providing empirical support for the heterogeneous-agent model over the representative-agent model unlike the aforementioned papers.
In the next section, I describe the environment of the model economies. Section 3 presents calibration, and Section 4 presents the main quantitative analysis. Section 5 explores empirical evidence related to the …ndings in Section 4. Section 6 concludes.
Model economies
This section describes two model economies used for the quantitative theoretical analysis in the following sections. The two model economies share the same economic environment such as the production sector, government sector, and the indivisibility of labor supply, but di¤er in terms of household heterogeneity.
Heterogeneous-agent model
I …rst present the heterogeneous-agent model, which is a standard GE model with incomplete markets (Imrohoro¼ glu, 1989; Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994) .
Households: There is a continuum of in…nitely-lived households who di¤er in their asset holdings a and productivity x in each period. A household decides how much to consume c and save for the next period a 0 . The productivity x 2 fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x Nx g follows a Markov chain with transition probabilities f ij g Nx i;j=1 where ij Pr(x 0 j jx i ). This idiosyncratic uncertainty cannot be fully insured because a is the only asset available to households. Labor supply is endogenous at the extensive margin (Rogerson, 1988; Chang and Kim, 2006) . The competitive factor markets imply that households Krueger, Mitman and Perri, 2016) .
3 take as given the wage rate per e¢ciency unit of labor w and the real interest rate r. Households also take as given the labor income tax l ; capital income tax k ; and transfers T:
The functional equation summarizing the decision problem of households is given by V (a; x i ) = max fW (a; x i ); N (a; x i )g ; where the value of working, W (a; x i ); and the value of non-working, N (a; x i ); are de…ned as
Households face budget constraints: the sum of current consumption and asset demands for the next period should not be greater than the sum of net-of-tax labor income (1 l )wx i h (if they choose to work), current asset holdings a; net-of-tax capital income r(1 k )a, and transfers T .
I(a > 0) is an indicator function such that capital income tax is only imposed when a is positive.
Households can borrow up to the limit a 0: When households choose to work, they earn labor income in return for disutility h where is disutility per hour and h is the full-time hours of work.
Households' expected future value P Nx j=1 ij V (a 0 ; x 0 j ) is discounted by a discount factor 2 (0; 1).
Firm: There is a representative …rm which produces aggregate output Y: Production technology is captured by a standard constant-returns-to-scale production function F (K; L) where the factors of production include capital K and aggregate e¢ciency units of labor L. The competitive …rm takes prices, r and w; as given and solves the following pro…t maximization problem:
where is the depreciation rate. As is standard in the literature, a Cobb-Douglas function is used 4 for production technology:
Government: There is a government which levies proportional income taxes on labor l and capital k . Using the collected tax revenues, the government provides transfers T to households and spends G while balancing its budget each period.
Although the focus of this paper is not on government transfers, it is important to introduce transfers in order to match the wealth gradient of employment rates in this class of models . Following Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) , I assume that transfers consist of two components:
where T 1 is given to all households equally and T 2 is the income security component.
Then, T 2 is allowed to be progressive following the functional form:
Note that there are two parameters shaping T 2 . The …rst parameter ! 0 0 is a scale parameter.
When ! 0 becomes higher, the second component of transfers T 2 becomes relatively larger. The second parameter ! 1 0 captures the progressivity of the transfer system. A higher ! 1 implies that T 2 decreases faster with productivity. As shown in Section 3, this parsimonious progressive transfer structure allows the model to successfully replicate the observed progressivity of government transfers across wealth quintiles. Government purchase G is determined to balance the period government budget constraint. 7
Equilibrium: A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of factor prices, w; r, aggregate allocations, K; L; household's decision rules g(a; x), h(a; x), value functions V (a; x); W (a; x); N (a; x), government policy variables l ; k ; T; G, and the distribution of households over the individual state space (a; x) such that 1. Given factor prices w; r, the value function V (a; x); W (a; x); N (a; x) solve the household's decision problems, and g(a; x), h(a; x) are the associated decision rules;
2. Given factor prices w; r, the …rm optimally chooses K d and L d following
3. Markets clear:
4. Government balances its budget:
5. The distribution of households is stationary: (a 0 ; x 0 ) implied by g(a; x), h(a; x), f ij g Nx i;j=1
and (a; x) is again (a; x):
Representative-agent model
This subsection presents the representative-agent counterpart of the heterogeneous-agent model introduced in the previous subsection. Since the only di¤erence between the two models is in the household sector, I describe the household sector of this representative-agent economy.
The economy is populated by a continuum of in…nitely-lived households whose productivity is homogeneous. I maintain the same assumption that labor supply is indivisible at the individual level; that is, each household can supply either 0 or h hours of work. Following the aggregation theory in Rogerson (1988) , one can show that the stand-in household period utility function has a key feature that disutility of work is linear in employment. 8
The stand-in household's dynamic problem in this representative-agent model is written as
where the household choose the optimal consumption C (or savings K 0 ) and the optimal fraction of the employed E 2 on labor income l is equal to 0:3 as in other related studies (Krusell et al. 2008 (Krusell et al. , 2010 AlonsoOrtiz and Rogerson, 2010) . 10 I set k equal to 0:38, which is in between the values in Domeij and
Heathcote (2004) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) . The parameter for the full-time hours of work, 9 The heterogeneous-agent model is solved and simulated numerically. The value functions and the decision rules are stored on 100 grid points for a, which are spaced unevenly, and x with Nx = 50. The value functions are interpolated using cubic splines. To approximate the distribution ; I use a much …ner grid (3000 points) over assets. The representative-agent model is solved analytically.
1 0 This rate is close to the average tax rate and is lower than the U.S. marginal tax rate of 0.4 computed in Prescott (2004) . The main results are not sensitive to alternative baseline tax rates around 0.3. (1) process, log x 0 = log x + " 0 ; where " is normally distributed with mean zero and the standard deviation of x ; following Rouwenhorst (1995) . The two parameters,
7
x and x are set to 0:94 and 0:205; as in Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) .
Parameters calibrated internally:
The remaining parameters are jointly calibrated to match the same number of target statistics. In the heterogeneous-agent model, these parameter values are determined as minimizers of the distance between the relevant statistics from U.S. data and those from the model-generated data. In the representative-agent model, I use the equations that characterize the steady-state equilibrium to calibrate these parameters.
The …rst parameter in Table 1 is ; which is the discount factor. This parameter is calibrated to match the steady-state real interest rate of 4%. Next, is the parameter capturing the disutility of work. The relevant target is the aggregate employment rate. According to the 2005 PSID, this ratio is 77:6%, which is used as another target statistic. Finally, a is the borrowing limit, which is relevant for the heterogeneous-agent model. The target statistic for this parameter is set as the share of wealth among the …rst wealth quintile (-1:1%) in the same PSID data set.
The next three parameters govern the government transfer system. Recall that the parameter T 1 determines the size of ‡at government transfers whereas ! 0 determines the size of progressive transfers. Since these two components can be distinguished in the heterogeneous-agent model, their relevant target statistics are set to be 6:8% and 3:8% of output, respectively (Krusell and 8 Rios-Rull, 1999) . On the other hand, the representative-agent model, which lacks heterogeneity, cannot incorporate progressivity. Therefore, ! 0 is irrelevant and T 1 is directly calibrated to match an aggregate transfers-output ratio of 10:6%. In the U.S., the presence of various means-tested programs leads to the fact that the poor households receive a substantially larger amount of transfers related to income security. The parameter ! 1 ; which shapes the progressivity of T 2 ; is calibrated to match the relative size of income security transfers going to the households in the bottom wealth quintile compared to its unconditional mean (2:36). 11
Although not reported, all model speci…cations with the reported calibrated values can match the target statistics precisely. In addition, by construction, all of the model speci…cations have the same capital-output ratio (2:65).
Distributional properties of the heterogeneous-agent model: In the heterogenous-agent model, the distribution of wealth is an endogenous object. Thus, I check how the heterogeneousagent model performs in terms of non-targeted moments across the distribution of wealth. The …rst row in Table 2 shows the wealth share by each wealth quintile in the U.S. The …rst two rows show that the heterogeneous-agent model does a good job of matching the distribution of wealth in the data. In particular, the model implies that the top wealth quintile holds close to 76% of the total wealth, which is close to 79% in the data. Table 2 also reports employment rates by wealth quintile. In U.S. data, employment rates by wealth quintile are relatively ‡at or slightly inverse U-shaped. Speci…cally, the employment is relatively low among the bottom wealth quintile (69%) and is quite ‡at around 82% in the second to fourth wealth quintiles. Then, the employment rate among the top wealth quintile is lower at 73%. The heterogeneous-agent model which incorporates progressive transfers and capital taxation does an excellent job of matching the employment rates by wealth quintile .
Finally, the last two rows in Table 2 show the conditional mean of T 2 in each wealth quintile relative to the unconditional mean of T 2 : Note that although the calibration only targets the …rst wealth quintile (2:36) , the functional form assumed in Section 2.1 does a good job of accounting for the observed degree of progressivity in income-security programs in the U.S. 
Quantitative analysis using model economies
This section presents the main quantitative-theoretic analysis using the calibrated model economies.
Employment response to labor tax changes in model economies
I begin by presenting equilibrium employment responses with respect to changes in the labor tax rate l in the model economies (e.g., Krusell et al. 2008 Krusell et al. , 2010 Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009; Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson, 2010) . In doing so, I consider two cases given that a change in l a¤ects the government budget constraint (5). The …rst case assumes that G is adjusted to balance the government budget while holding T …xed. I consider this case as the baseline in the next subsection because this assumption simpli…es the decomposition exercise by muting additional feedback e¤ects from a change in T: However, in the current subsection, I also consider the second case in which T is adjusted (in the heterogeneous-agent model, T 1 and T 2 are adjusted in the same proportion) while holding G …xed. This assumption allows for feedback through T since a higher tax would increases T , which in turn has negative income e¤ects on labor supply. quintile features a clear inverse U-shape when l is set to be 45%. The last three rows in Table 3 show that this shape is very close to its counterpart in France, Germany and Italy, constructed using samples from the Eurosystem's Household Finance and Consumption Survey. This highlights that the heterogeneous-agent model is able to account for not only the aggregate employment pattern but also the distributional aspects in employment. The …rst thing to note is that both models predict sizeable e¤ects of labor taxes on aggregate In addition to Table 4 , the following regression provides a more concrete number (i.e., the labor supply elasticity), which measures the degree of employment responsiveness to net-of-tax changes in percentage term (e.g., Chetty et al., 2012) :
where E refers to employment. The estimate of 1 is 0:347 in the heterogeneous-agent model and it is 0:353 in the representative-agent model when G adjusts holding T …xed. In the case when T adjusts holding G …xed, it is 0:898 in the heterogeneous-agent model and 0:827 in the representativeagent model. These similar slope estimates clearly demonstrate that household heterogeneity may not be crucial at least when it comes to aggregate employment responsiveness to labor tax changes.
Decomposing equilibrium employment changes
I now move on to the main question of this paper: transmission channels through which labor tax changes a¤ect aggregate employment. Note that even if the aggregate employment responses are 1 3 See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) .
12 similar, the underlying transmission channels could di¤er substantially. An equilibrium aggregate employment response with respect to labor tax changes can be decomposed as follows: 14
Speci…cally, an equilibrium change in employment (dE) with respect to a change in the labor tax (d l ) can be decomposed into several components. The …rst term on the right-hand side captures the employment change directly driven by labor tax changes while holding …xed equilibrium changes such as the wage and real interest rate. Since changes in labor taxes could in ‡uence equilibrium factor prices, the equilibrium employment change can be additionally a¤ected by the second part (GE e¤ects)-the sum of employment changes caused by changes in wage w and real interest rate r. It should be noted that each GE e¤ect can be either positive or negative depending on the sign of each sub-term (i.e., ). In other words, GE feedback may reinforce or dampen the negative e¤ects of labor taxes on employment.
As for the decomposition in the heterogeneous-agent model, a graphical presentation of the results is useful. In Figure 1 , I …rst plot the changes in employment solely based on direct e¤ects response to labor taxes considerably. 1 4 The decomposition is for the baseline case where G adjusts with respect to l . As noted above, the decomposition would require feedback from transfers in the case when T adjusts instead.
1 5 Hence, the mirror image of the solid line corresponds to the …rst row of Table 4 . In the case of the representative-agent model, this decomposition is trivial due to the following results. The proofs are in Appendix.
Lemma 1 The capital-to-labor ratio (
K E ) in the representative-agent model is independent of l across steady states.
Proposition 2
The equilibrium wage and interest rate in the representative-agent model are independent of l :
Because the equilibrium factor prices are a function of the capital-to-labor ratio, which is independent of l ; GE feedback in the representative-agent model is neutral (
. According to (7), this implies that the equilibrium e¤ects of labor taxes in the representative-agent model are solely due to the direct e¤ects. To summarize the decomposition exercises above, Table 5 reports the estimates of the labor supply elasticity using model-generated data from the heterogeneous-agent model and the representative-agent model. Despite the similar elasticities in the …rst row based on the GE responses, the second row reveals that the direct responses that hold prices …xed are substantially weaker in the heterogeneous-agent model. Table 5 also reports the di¤erence in the contribution of each GE channel. 16 First, note that adding each of the GE channels reinforces the direct employment response in the heterogeneous-agent model since the increments are all positive while GE feedback plays no role in the representative-agent model. Second, in the heterogeneous-agent model, adjustments of equilibrium interest rates are quantitatively much more signi…cant in amplifying the elasticity (ranging from +0:16 to +0:22) than equilibrium wage adjustments (around +0:01). The next subsection explores the underlying mechanisms for this …nding.
14

Inspecting the transmission mechanism
This subsection investigates in detail the transmission mechanism quanti…ed in the previous subsection. According to (7), the sign and magnitude of GE feedback driven by equilibrium price changes can be traced back to the two separate terms: (i) changes in market-clearing prices with respect to The …rst two rows of Table 6 show how equilibrium prices change with respect to the labor tax rate l : 17 A key …nding to note is that the equilibrium wage decreases with l whereas the real interest rate increases with l : For example, an increase in l from 30% to 45% leads the equilibrium wage to fall by 1:2% while it leads the interest rate to rise from 4.0% to 4:3%.
Then the question is why a higher l leads to lower wages and higher interest rates. As (1) and (2) show that changes in w and r crucially depend on the equilibrium capital-to-labor ratio (K=L), the bottom three rows of Table 6 report how key aggregate variables, including K and L; change with respect to l . 18 It shows that the response of aggregate e¢ciency unit of labor L has the same sign but is substantially weaker than that of employment E and aggregate capital stock K. This implies that a higher l would decrease K=L, which in turn implies lower w and higher r.
The …nding that changes in L are weaker than other aggregate variables in the heterogeneous- Figure 2 , I plot how employment rates by (log) productivity change when the labor tax rate changes from 30% to either 15% (dashed line) or 45% (dash-dot line). Note that with respect to such sizeable labor tax changes, most employment changes are driven by workers with below median productivity. Since L entails the composition of households with productivity x i who choose to work, its change can be much dampened compared to E if the average productivity level of households who change their employment decision is lower than the average productivity level of workers. This is clearly the case in Figure 2 .
The middle panel of Figure 2 plots the average asset holding choices by (log) productivity.
Unlike employment decisions, households with high productivity change their savings decision quite substantially. Although highly productivity households stay working in response to higher labor taxes l , their disposable labor income declines by a factor of the net-of-tax rate (i.e., 1 l ):
These substantial saving responses of households with high productivity, who hold a large fraction of aggregate capital, make the aggregate capital stock to respond strongly to the labor tax change.
This explains why K responds more strongly than L in Table 6 , which is key for understanding why the ratio of capital to labor decreases with the labor tax rate.
I have so far investigated changes in market-clearing prices with respect to labor tax changes (i.e., @w @ l and @r @ l ). As emphasized earlier, the other important terms in identifying GE feedback channels are the employment responses to wages and interest rates (i.e., @E @w and @E @r ). Table 7 reports percentage point changes in employment obtained by changing market prices permanently from the baseline stationary equilibrium. The …rst two rows report the e¤ects of wage changes on employment and show that higher wages lead to moderate increases in aggregate employment.
More interestingly, it also reveals that a lower interest rate increases aggregate employment quite substantially. For instance, a change in the real interest rate from 4% to 3:9% induces aggregate employment to rise by 1:0 percentage point, which is quantitatively very similar to the aggregate employment e¤ect of a 10% wage increase. In other words, a seemingly small change in the interest rate such as one percentage point can be comparable to a quantitatively sizeable change in aggregate wage such as 10% when it comes to their impact on aggregate employment.
A closer look reveals that these similar aggregate employment responses are driven by very di¤erent households. Speci…cally, while wage changes a¤ect the labor supply decisions of poor households more elastically, it is the rich households who adjust labor supply more elastically to a change in the interest rate. A lower real interest rate reduces asset demands (or capital supply), in particular of the rich households. The resulting negative income e¤ects on labor supply raise employment, and, in particular, this e¤ect is disproportionately stronger for the wealth-rich households.
Empirical analysis using cross-country panel data
The previous section has found that, in the heterogeneous-agent model, GE feedback through interest rate changes ampli…es the negative employment impact of higher labor taxes whereas it is neutral in the representative-agent model. In small open economies (SOEs), the equilibrium interest rate is less tightly linked to domestic circumstances. Therefore, the employment impact of labor taxes should be weaker in the small open economies according to the transmission mechanism of the heterogeneous-agent model while they should be similar according to the prediction of the representative-agent model.
To explore this, I construct a cross-country panel data set combined from di¤erent data sources. I begin by plotting the relationship between labor tax rates and labor supply at the extensive margin in Figure 3 . In the left panel, the extensive margin labor supply is measured by (log) employment-population ratios and, in the right panel, it is measured by (log) labor force participation rates. Each panel shows their relationship among SOEs (right) and among non-SOEs (left), 1 9 See Appendix for details on categorization and data on openness separately. First, note that all four relationships in Figure 3 suggest that a higher labor tax rate is associated with a lower labor supply at the extensive margin. This is consistent with the literature which …nds that labor taxes are an important determinant of cross-country di¤erences in total hours worked (Prescott, 2004; Ohanian et al., 2008; and Rogerson, 2008 among others) .
A more striking and new …nding is that this negative relationship is much weaker among SOEs than non-SOEs in both panels. To investigate this …nding more carefully, consider panel regressions which extend (6). Speci…cally, I estimate the extensive margin elasticity gap in SOEs relative to non-SOEs using the following equation:
where I(soe it ) is an indicator function which is 1 for SOEs and is 0 otherwise. Then, 2 would capture an increment of the extensive margin elasticity among SOEs relative to non-SOEs. If 2 is not di¤erent from zero, then one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the extensive margin elasticity is the same between SOEs and the others. Note that the main purpose of this regression analysis is not to identify the unbiased estimates of the extensive margin elasticity but rather to test if the association between labor tax rates and the extensive margin labor supply found in Figure 3 are robust. Thus, I include control variables such as country …xed e¤ects, year …xed e¤ects, and log income per capita (y it ). Country …xed e¤ects can capture various unobservable heterogeneity at the country level. Given the potential existence of unobserved heterogeneity across countries, the inclusion of country …xed e¤ects can be preferred in this type of cross-country regressions. Next, it is useful to include year …xed e¤ects and log income per capita in order to control for business cycle ‡uctuations. Note that log income per capita may also capture overall wage growth, which itself may a¤ect the employment rate. Table 8 reports the estimation results using both measures of the extensive margin labor supply. Column (1) does not include any control variables. Columns (2)- (8) include a di¤erent combination of control variables explained above.
The key results are summarized as follows. First, note that the estimate of 1 is positive in all speci…cations (1)- (8) of both tables and is statistically signi…cant at the 95% con…dence level in most speci…cations with the robust standard errors, clustered at the country level. This estimate measures the percentage change in the extensive margin labor supply with respect to a percentage change in the net-of-tax rate (i.e., the extensive margin labor supply elasticity) in non-SOEs. Interestingly, the estimate of 1 is quite sizeable, ranging from 0:4 to 0:6 when the employment-population ratio is used. 20
More importantly, the estimate of 2 , which captures the increment of the elasticity for SOEs, is negative in all speci…cations. In both tables, the point estimates are robustly around 0: 25. 21 This is economically meaningful, given the magnitude of the estimate of 1 : The above the panel regressions with various controls suggest that the key …nding of Figure 3 that the labor tax rates are weakly associated with extensive margin labor supply in SOEs is a robust feature of the data.
This supports the heterogeneous-agent model over the representative-agent model, the former of which highlights equilibrium interest rates as an important ampli…cation channel through which labor taxes reduce the extensive margin labor supply.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have explored the role of GE channels in the employment e¤ects of labor tax changes. I have found that GE feedback, in particular of interest rate adjustments, reinforces the negative employment impact of higher labor taxes in the heterogeneous-agent model whereas GE plays no role in the representative-agent model. A key underlying reason for this is shown to be heterogeneous labor supply responses and savings decisions across households in the heterogeneousagent model. Using the cross-country panel data, I have found that, in small open economies, where the equilibrium interest rate is less tightly linked to the domestic circumstances, the employment e¤ects of labor taxes are much weaker.
The …ndings in this paper have some important implications. First, the role of equilibrium interest rates found in this paper implies that the exogenously …xed interest rate in model economies used to investigate the e¤ects of labor taxes may not be innocuous. Relatedly, this paper highlights the importance of incorporating capital markets even when the key object of interest is the e¤ects of labor taxes. Lastly, this paper provides a counterexample to the conventional view that GE feedback is a dampening force.
A novel empirical …nding in this paper is the di¤erence in the degree of negative relationships between labor taxes and aggregate employment. Although the key mechanism considered in this paper can be an important underlying source of this relationship, there could also be alternative explanations for this weaker negative relationship between labor taxes and the extensive margin labor supply in small open economies. This interesting exploration is left for future work.
Analytical results for the representative-agent model
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the following equations.
Proof of Lemma 1 Rearranging (1) gives
This can be combined with (4) to yield
which shows that K=E does not depend on l :
Proof of Proposition 2 Since K H does not depend on l ; (3) and (4) imply that w and r do not change with respect to changes in l across steady states. The data on the employment rate across wealth distribution in European countries in Table   3 are constructed using samples from the second wave of the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), conducted by the European Central Bank. I use the sample weights provided by the HFCS. The sample restrictions are imposed equivalently to the PSID data above.
Speci…cally, I consider households in which the reference person's age is between 18 and 70 and the reference person's main job is not self-employment. The resulting number of observations are 8,737 for France, 3,153 for Germany, and 4,963 for Italy. A household is de…ned as employed if the reference person's weekly hours worked is greater than 1,000 hours divided by 52. Wealth is measured by the net worth, which is the value of total assets minus total liabilities. 1970 -1983 1984 Canada -1970 France 1970 -1989 1990 Germany -1970 Italy 1970 -1989 1990 Japan 1970 -1971 1972 Netherlands -1970 Spain 1970 -1992 1993 Sweden -1970 United Kingdom 1970 -1978 1979 United States -1970 Note the …nancial openness of a country annually . I use the updated Chinn-Ito Index, which can be linked to the extensive margin labor information for the entire sample period . The Chinn-Ito Index ranges from -1.90 to 2.37. 2 I de…ne a country in each year to be 1 The results based on the data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics International Labor Comparisons program which covers shorter periods Table A1 shows the list of countries and years categorized according to this de…nition.
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Countries are categorized into the two groups-small or large, based on the long-run GDP. The long-run GDP is computed as the average of the GDP during the years 1950-2013. Then, the median country based on the long-run GDP is Italy, followed by Canada. The size di¤erence between Italy and France, the next larger country, is substantially smaller than the di¤erence between Italy and Canada. Hence, I group the largest six countries including the median (i.e., France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as large economies, and the remaining …ve countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) as small economies.
